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Introduction
During the past two decades, foreign direct investment (FDI) has become increasingly important in the developing world, with a growing number of developing countries succeeding in attracting substantial and rising amounts of inward FDI. The theoretical literature in economics identifies a number of channels through which FDI inflows may be beneficial to the receiving economy. Yet, the empirical literature has lagged behind and has had more trouble identifying these advantages in practice. Most prominently, a large number of applied papers have looked at the FDI-growth nexus, but their results have been far from conclusive.
1 Notwithstanding the absence of any robust conclusions, most countries continue to vigorously pursue policies aimed at encouraging more FDI inflows.
2 Table 1 presents recent trends in FDI inflows both as a percent of output and as a percent of fixed capital formation. Apparent is the worldwide trend increase in the importance of FDI (using both measures), with FDI inflows during the past decade increasing to 4-5 times the level experienced during the 1980s. While there was a doubling of foreign investment into East Asia during this time period, the Asian FDI inflow period peaked in 1995-1999 and current levels are still below that peak.
A closer look at these measures for China (including Hong Kong) and Vietnam reveals a similar trend, with both experiencing almost no inflows during the 1980s and a very dramatic increase throughout the 1990s. Relative to the size of their economies FDI flows into Vietnam are almost twice as large as those flowing into China. Neither 1 With the availability of better data, the last few years have seen an especially large number of empirical papers devoted to this question (e.g., Alfaro et al., 2004; Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Durham, 2004; Hsiao and Shen, 2003; and Li and Liu, 2005) . 2 For a critical look at these domestic tax/subsidy policies, see Hanson (2001) and Mooij and Ederveen (2003) . Gastanaga et al. (1998) analyze other host-country policies that aim to encourage FDI inflows. 3 country's experience appears unique in the region; their FDI inflows show the same relative magnitudes and temporal dynamics as other countries in East Asia.
FDI inflows are not uniformly distributed across production sectors, nor is their sectoral composition (Tables 2 and 3 ) the same for the two countries. For China, the dominant sector, industry!defined as a combination of mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and utilities (electricity, gas, and water)!accounts for 82.9% of total inflows out of five sectors for which data are available. For Vietnam, the industrial sector accounts for less than 46% of total inflows out of eight sectors for which data are available.
It may be possible to gain insight into the FDI-growth nexus by examining FDI impacts at the sectoral level. And the dramatic but uneven opening of these two economies provides a promising environment in which to look for industry-differences.
The opening up of China and Vietnam to foreign investments began in 1979 and 1987, respectively. Since then, the legal regimes governing foreign investments have been progressively liberalized with important modifications to the laws governing such investments made in recent years.
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At the same time, liberalization is far from complete in both countries, and customary rules may often be in conflict with the formal legal code. These customary rules require an individual to obey local rules drafted by community leaders over and above the government's laws. Any effort by the central government to contact the individual directly may be met with "bamboo fences" in a system that values community benefits above private ones. These customary rules create a patronage system that invites 4 corruption among government officials at the intermediate levels. 4 In a 2006 ranking of property rights from the Heritage Foundation, both China and Vietnam rank very low, with China ranking a 4 and Vietnam a 5 (for an index 1-5 with low scores implying better property rights protection). 5 All these characteristics make China's and Vietnam's governance exceptionally weak and inconsistent and make it more difficult to maintain an environment friendly to foreign investors. These barriers are likely to be more important in some sectors than in others, potentially affecting the growth effects deriving from FDI in particular sectors.
In this paper, we use an augmented production function to estimate the impact of FDI on growth using sectoral data for Vietnam and China (including Hong Kong). We let FDI affect GDP growth directly and also indirectly through its interaction with labor.
This approach creates heteroskedasticity, and so feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) is employed. The results show that FDI in both countries has a positive and statistically significant effect on economic growth operating directly and indirectly through interaction with labor. Interestingly, the effect is not equally distributed across economic sectors. FDI only has a consistently positive effect on growth in the manufacturing sector; its effect on other sectors is usually statistically insignificant, in some cases even negative.
Our paper contributes insights on the FDI-growth nexus in several important ways. First, we employ a case study (single-country) regression-based approach that enables us to disregard variables that measure the institutional, legal and cultural environment in which FDI projects are implemented and which may have an important 5 impact on their growth consequences. The difficulty measuring these institutional characteristics hinders easy identification in cross-country approaches.
6 Second, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to use data from different sectors to examine the sectoral differences in the impact of FDI on economic growth. This is potentially important since much of the recent theoretical and empirical micro-econometric literature concludes that FDI spillovers, if they exist, are found in intra-industry rather than in inter-industry settings. 7 This finding further justifies our attempt to ask whether the impact of FDI on growth might be different for different sectors and to begin to investigate whether particular sectoral characteristics are conducive to a positive impact of FDI.
Finally, we believe that the experience of China and Vietnam may be similar to the development path taken by a significant number of other countries, especially those that have recently opened up their economies after years of economic repression and that have experienced rapid rise in trade, FDI and incomes. This last point, of course, opens up a new comparative research agenda that we intend to pursue in future work.
A number of hypotheses have been offered regarding the interaction of foreign investment and growth. Singer (1950) argued that FDI will "crowd out" domestic investment since foreign firms often have greater access, at better terms, to international capital markets and will use the cheaper credit to drive out otherwise productive firms.
This makes the foreign firms superior to the domestic ones in financing large projects and in taking advantage of changes in comparative costs, consumers' tastes, and market 6 conditions. Findlay (1978) Romer (1990) looks at technology as a non-rival input and at foreign direct investment as a source of technological advance. In this case, the FDI effect is unequivocally positive. Bhagwati (1978 Bhagwati ( , 1985 on the other hand, suggests that the growth effects of FDI might be positive for export promoting (EP) countries but negative for import substituting (IS) ones; the reduction of foreign import goods in the domestic market reduces competition and efforts to improve efficiency among the domestic firms.
Reis (2001) uses an endogenous growth model to evaluate the growth effects of FDI when the investing firm's profits may be repatriated. She finds that, in equilibrium, foreign firms replace all domestic firms in the R&D sector. In this model, FDI only adds a positive effect to growth if the world interest rate is lower than the home interest rate.
These hypotheses guide, to a large extent, all the empirical research that is described in the following section. Section 2 provides a brief survey on the state of current empirical work on the growth effects of FDI. Section 3 presents our model and the data we use.
Section 4 analyzes the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
Existing Empirical Literature
In light of the conflicting results in the theoretical literature, the FDI-growth problem remains largely an empirical one. In this section, we describe the current state of 7 empirical research on the FDI-growth nexus through cross-country studies, intra-regional comparisons, and specific case studies.
Cross-Country Studies
The early empirical work on the FDI-growth nexus modified the growth accounting method introduced by Solow (1957 Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) find support for Bhagwati's hypothesis (1978, 1985) that the growth effect of FDI is positive for export promoting countries and might be negative for import substituting ones.
However, the growth rate of capital in growth accounting equations might be correlated with the growth rate of technology. Hence, there might be endogeneity biases involved in their estimation. Another empirical problem of the Solow-Swan model lies in its fast convergence. Mankiw et al. (1992) test their theoretical model of endogenous growth and find that, with human capital added to physical capital, the rate of convergence is much slower.
Influenced by this approach, most empirical models add education to the augmented equation as a proxy for human capital. Blomstrom et al. (1994) and Coe et al. (1995) find that, for FDI to have positive impacts on growth, the host country must have attained a level of development that helps it reap the benefits of higher productivity. In contrast, De Mello (1996) finds that the correlation between FDI and domestic investment is negative in developed countries. Li and Liu (2005) find that FDI not only affects growth directly but also indirectly through its interaction with human capital.
Using a larger sample, Borensztein et al. (1998) 
Regional and Country-Specific Empirical Studies
Mortimore ( Regarding Vietnam, very little detailed analysis on growth effects of FDI has been conducted. Two papers by Kokko and Zejan (1996) and Kokko et al. (2003) Our data and methodology permit us to avoid some of the key problems that plague this literature. Furthermore, by implementing the same methodology for two different country-specific datasets, we are able to provide some evidence on the generality of our results.
Methodology and Data

Methodology
We use the conventional augmented Cobb-Douglas production function:
where Y, L, and K are real GDP, labor, and physical capital (henceforth simply capital), respectively; C is a vector of control variables such as exports, imports, infrastructure, etc. The subscripts are for sector i, variable j, and time t; !, $, ", and # are parameters; v i is the sector-specific disturbance and % it the general disturbance.
Taking natural logarithms of Equation (1) yields the linear form:
12 During the high growth phase of economic development, we expect that the productivity of labor and capital will evolve over time. Because a plausible channel for host-country growth effects of FDI is through labor-augmenting technical transfers, 9 we write the coefficient of labor as a linear function of FDI.
where F it are u it are the inflow of FDI and the idiosyncratic disturbance for sector i at time t. 10 We then follow the conventional literature on economic growth and write the capital coefficient as a linear function of human capital:
where t H is human capital and e it is the idiosyncratic disturbance. Substituting Equations (3) and (4) into Equation (2) yields:
where ln ln
( is a composite disturbance for sector i at time t. There are two sources of heteroskedasticity in this model: one through L and the other through C, as these two variables vary across sectors and change over time. The variance of the composite disturbance can be written as:
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The specific form of heteroscedasticity predicted by the model can be accounted for using an appropriate feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator. The estimable form of Equation (5) 
where GDP is the log of output; FDI is log of FDI; LAB is the log of labor; CAP is the log of capital; HUM is the log of human capital; and CON is the log of the other control variables. Note that we allow for FDI to affect growth directly as well as through its interaction with labor.
We first estimate Equation (7) using least squares with dummy variables (LSDV)
to eliminate sector specific effects. 12 We include a standard White correction for any heteroskedasticity not related to the dynamics of lnL and lnC (robust least squares with dummy variables, LSDVR). Obtaining the residual p t from this estimation, its squared term, 2 t p , can be generated as the estimated value of -2 .
From Equation (6), 2 t p depends on lnL it and lnK it . Hence, we estimate equation (6), using LSDVR once more, and obtain estimated value q t , which is a feasible substitute for the elements of the matrix of the variance of the composite disturbance. Finally, we scale all terms in Equation (7) by the square root of q t to obtain the homoskedasticity needed for the regression. Details are given in Appendix A. However, several sectors either lack data for most of the time period or do not match the FDI data, leaving only five sectors for estimation: industry, construction, transportation and communication, real estate, and agriculture-fishery-forestry (henceforth agriculture). 13 In the Industrial Output section of the VSY, industry is defined as a combination of mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and utilities (electricity, gas and fuel, and water supply), so we sum these sectors to obtain data on industry. Data on GDP of real-estate for 1990-1994 are not available, so we have an unbalanced panel.
14 The VSY and the GSOV's website provide data for the labor force from 1990 to 2003. We obtained data for investment-newly increase in fixed assets-for the whole period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) for eighteen sectors from the VSY and GSOV's website, five of which match the data for FDI.
The GSOV only provides FDI inflows data for approved amounts. Data on actual FDI projects implemented for eleven economic sectors from 1988 to 2003 is available 13 Data for agriculture, fishery, and forestry are also provided separately in the VSY but are combined here to match the IMF's data set for FDI. 14 For 1995-2003, we add GDP data on hotels and restaurants to GDP data on real estate, renting and business activities to obtain GDP data on the real-estate sector that nearly match the IMF's data on FDI for real-estate, which is defined a combination hotels , tourism and other real estate.
from the International Monetary Fund's appendices to its Annual Report for Vietnam.
The data are originally provided by the Vietnamese authorities, and then adjusted by IMF staff. Since data on GDP add oil and gas to industrial sector, we also add the oil-and-gas sector in the IMF's data on FDI to its data on FDI for industrial sector and label this new variable as FDI for "industry." Because of the possible discrepancy between the two data sets, we also perform a robustness check using Vietnam's data for a subset of years, 1995-2003. 15 Chinese data for GDP are available for five sectors: agriculture, industry, construction, transportation-post-and-telecommunications, and wholesale-trade-and- 1986, 1994, 1995, and 1996 are missing. Because the data's different origins and missing observations raise consistency concerns; we also perform regressions using China's data for a subset of years, 1997-2004, as a robustness check. 15 We have chosen to include FDI data in constant U.S. dollars in our growth regressions rather than data in local currency because of the difficulty interpreting exchange rate values under capital controls and, in the case of China, the dual currency regime that existed prior to 1993. A parallel analysis using real FDI in local currency (not reported here) gives similar results to those reported here, with slightly smaller aggregate effects of FDI. At the sectors level, the construction effect for China becomes significantly larger than the industrial sector; the industrial sectoral effect for Vietnam is slightly larger than the results reported here. 16 Similar to the Vietnamese counterpart, CSY's data on value added for industrial output is also divided into these three sub-sectors.
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The CSY provides data on labor force for sixteen sectors from 1985 to 2002. This yields admittedly small samples for analysis, particularly when industry effects are included, but this is the best one can do with currently-available data.
Results
Specification Tests
We carry out a downward piece-wise specification search in order to avoid omitted variable bias. We start with all available variables that may explain economic growth based on past research. The variables are then eliminated gradually, using multicolinearity tests. Gathering all available data, we start with a total of nine explanatory variables: FDI, labor, their interaction, capital, the real interest rate, education, exports, imports, telecommunication, and infrastructure. The model is initially estimated without interaction terms. As a preliminary step, we use robust OLS to control for heteroscedasticity rather than sector fixed-effects estimation to preserve information that might be lost once the time-invariant effects are included.
We carry out multicolinearity tests using the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) approach (Kennedy, 2003 
There is the potential for important endogeneity between several of the right-hand variables and real GDP. We carry out endogeneity t-tests for each right-hand-side variable, in each case including six sectoral dummies to eliminate sector-specific effects (year dummies are not found to be significant). 22 The estimation results, reported in Table   4 , do not indicate significant endogeneity, and so a two-stage least squares method is not suggested. 
Growth Effects of FDI
22 The endogeneity t-test is a form of the Hausmann (1978) specification test. A right-hand side variable is treated as the instrument in a first-stage regression, and the resulting error is introduced as a regressor in the second-stage regression. If the coefficient on this error term is significantly different from zero, this is taken as evidence of the existence of endogeneity. 23 We have also performed Granger causality tests as described in Geweke et al. (1983) . We regress the FDILAB variable on its own lags, GDP lags, and other variables, using the FGLS estimation, and then test the significance of GDP lags. The t statistics for individual lagged GDPs and p values of the F-statistic for jointly lagged GDPs are all insignificant. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of no reverse causality. 
We begin by examining aggregate effects of FDI. The results of FGLS estimation for Vietnam are given in Table 5 . Note that the fixed effect estimations using LSDV approach produces in this case very high R-squared values, these arise out of the large differences in production levels across sectors, and are an important justification for our panel specification.
Column 5.1 presents estimation of the benchmark empirical model including only the control variables, labor, human capital, physical capital, the interest rate, and the human capital-capital interaction term. The signs of the coefficient estimates generally fit our priors. In column 5.2 we add the FDI measure described above. The term enters with a positive and significant effect (at the 1% level). An interaction of FDI with labor (5.3) also yields positive and significant FDI effects, working indirectly through interaction with labor. Including both the level of FDI and the interaction term (5.4) does not markedly change the magnitudes of estimated coefficients, but the FDI and labor terms are no longer statistically different from zero. Table 6 presents equivalent results for the China data set. Column 6.1 presents estimation of the benchmark empirical model including only the control variables, labor, human capital, physical capital, the interest rate, and the human capital-capital interaction term. The signs of the coefficient estimates also generally fit our priors. Qualitatively, the effects of FDI are very similar to those for Vietnam, although the estimated parameters on labor are consistently higher. For China, the estimated direct and indirect effects of FDI on growth are positive but smaller than those for Vietnam. When both the interaction term and the level of FDI are included (6.4), the level of FDI variable is no longer significantly different from zero for both countries.
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The impact we identified for aggregate FDI was statistically significant and positive. It is possible that the aggregate results mask important differences in the effect of FDI on economic performance across individual sectors. In Tables 7 and 8 we report FGLS estimation results for regressions that include all of the previously discussed control variables and that also allow for sector-specific effects of FDI on growth by including sectoral slope dummies. The industrial sector is our baseline. Columns 7.1 and 8.1 report the effects without control for differences in sectoral growth rates that are not attributable to the impact of FDI inflows. We find that the effect of FDI on growth is significant for the industrial sector in China but not in Vietnam.
Since we do observe different average growth rates for different sectors, we include in columns 7.2 and 8.2 sectoral fixed effects. Now the effect of FDI on growth is significant for the industrial sector in both countries. Additionally, we also find evidence that the impact of FDI on growth varies considerably across sectors in both countries. In particular, each of the non-industrial sectors exhibits a significantly smaller sensitivity to sectoral FDI inflows than that of the industrial sector. In most cases, the FDI effects for These results are not entirely surprising. First, we may expect capital-intensive sectors and ones in which technology plays a major role to exhibit a more positive impact of FDI inflows on factor productivity. In addition, it may be much easier for firms in these externally-oriented sectors to overcome the peculiar institutional rigidities that we discussed above and therefore take advantage of the benefits of FDI inflows on economic growth.
Conclusion
While most economists seem to agree that FDI is beneficial (if perhaps doubting the wisdom of government subsidies for investing multinationals), many policymakers and to a larger extent NGOs appear much less sanguine. In this work, we have estimated the impact of FDI on growth in different economic sectors using data from China and 22
Vietnam. Using an augmented production function, we allow FDI to directly affect GDP growth and also to indirectly affect growth through interaction with labor. The influence of FDI on labor is permitted to vary over time through an idiosyncratic disturbance, requiring a particular FGLS estimation procedure. The results reveal that FDI has a significant and positive effect on economic growth through its interaction with labor in both countries. However, the effect is not equally distributed across sectors. In both countries, the industrial sector seems to be the only sector to consistently benefit from FDI inflows.
From a policy perspective, two observations appear to follow from these results. The relatively small available data samples, and the existence of discrepancies among data sources, suggest caution in interpreting these results. More and better data and comparative work with sectoral data from other countries are plainly needed. Also, we have focused on the growth effect of FDI inflows. It would be useful to explore whether other types of capital inflows-equity and foreign loans-also have differential 23 growth effects across sectors, and whether they too show both direct and indirect impact on economic growth.
Appendix A. FGLS Estimation
After a fixed effect estimation of Equation (5) Sector 1990 Sector -1994 Sector 1995 Sector -1998 Sector 1999 Sector -2002 Sector 1990 Sector -2002 Sector 1985 Sector -1989 Sector 1990 Sector -1994 Sector 1995 Sector -1998 Sector 1999 Sector -2002 Sector 1985 Sector -2002 Notes: Specification is given in equation (8), estimated with fixed-effects by feasible GLS as described on pages 12-13. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are * 10 percent level, ** 5 percent level, *** 1 percent level. Notes: Specification is given in equation (8), estimated with fixed-effects by feasible GLS as described on pages 12-13. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are * 10 percent level, ** 5 percent level, *** 1 percent level. Notes: Specification is given in equation (8), estimated by feasible GLS as described on pages 12-13. The coefficient reported for manufacturing is the slope coefficient on FDI or FDIxLAB; manufacturing is the omitted sectoral dummy. Coefficients on pure industry fixed effects (7.2 and 7.3) are not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are * 10 percent level, ** 5 percent level, *** 1 percent level. Notes: Specification is given in equation (8), estimated by feasible GLS as described on pages 12-13. The coefficient reported for manufacturing is the slope coefficient on FDI or FDIxLAB; manufacturing is the omitted sectoral dummy. Coefficients on pure industry fixed effects (8.2 and 8.3) are not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are *10 percent level, **5 percent level, ***1 percent level.
